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"Argument Quality and Cultural Difference" is Harvey Siegel’s latest sally in his
longstanding campaign against epistemic relativism (see Siegel 1987). This
time Siegel is intent to guard against inroads by relativism from the direction of
multi-culturalism and various kinds of postmodern critique of communal or
objective norms of argumentation. Specifically, he argues that the epistemic
goodness of arguments is independent of cultural differences among arguers. I
will call this position Siegel’s "Independence Thesis." He formulates the
Independence Thesis—that is, he expresses his position about the
independence of argument normativity—in various ways, which I draw together
as follows:
Independence Thesis (IT)
What makes an argument a good argument epistemically—good in the sense
that its premises "provide reasons for embracing its conclusion," "justify the
conclusion," or "render[...] it worthy of belief"—is a "quality that is a feature of
the argument itself, rather than of the person(s) assessing its quality," a feature
that is "independent of the cultural locations and perspectives of its evaluators"
and in that sense [epistemic] argument normativity is "impersonal" and
"transcultural."
Siegel adds: "The premises of the argument provide whatever support for its
conclusion they do . . . whoever is conducting the evaluation, in whatever
cultural context."
(By the way, although he writes that "[a]rgument normativity is a variety of
epistemic normativity," thus apparently denying that there are other modalities
of argument normativity, such the rhetorical or the pragmatic, my guess is that’s
a slip, and what Siegel would want to say is that, of the kinds of argument
normativity there are, he is here interested in epistemic normativity. His thesis
does not rely on denying non-epistemic argument normativity, nor does he
deny it elsewhere, for all the centrality—the primacy?—he assigns to epistemic
normativity in his other writings on argumentation. See, for instance, Biro and
Siegel 1992, Siegel and Biro 1995.)
In defending the Independence Thesis, Siegel considers four lines of attack on
it that do or might come from the recent emphasis on multi-culturalism, from
attacks on the hegemony of Western culture, and from the broader attacks on
objectivism originating in some recent critiques of modernism. He argues, in
general, that while there is some truth to the multi-cultural viewpoint, it does not
support the cultural relativity of argument quality. So I take his strategy to be to
strengthen the case for the Independence Thesis, not by defending it directly,
but by removing these four objections to it. I will briefly review Siegel’s four
arguments.

Argument A (the argument about transcendence). While it is true that no
completely transcendent perspective is possible, it does not follow that
individuals cannot transcend one or another of their particular perspectives.
Hence what truth there is in the no-transcendence thesis does not show that
argument quality must be relative to an individual’s particular cultural
perspective.
Argument B (the argument about the universal vs. the particular). While it is true
that principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are
particular in the respect that they are articulated and endorsed in particular
historical/cultural circumstances, it does not follow that such principles and
criteria apply only to arguments formulated in that context. Hence what truth
there is about the contrast between a universal perspective and a particular
perspective does not show that argument quality must be relative to an
individual’s historical/cultural circumstances.
Argument C (the argument about transcultural normative reach). The proponent
of the position that norms of argument quality are culturally relative faces two
unappetizing implications. First, it is not possible for its proponent consistently
to defend cultural relativism, since to do so must presuppose some
transcultural normative perspective. Any pro-cultural relativism argument is thus
self-defeating. Second, it is not possible for the proponent of cultural relativism
consistently to criticize any particular perspective (such as slavery, sexism or
patriarchy), since to do so must again presuppose some transcultural
normative perspective, which cultural relativism precludes.
Argument D (against the position that argument is a rhetorical device masking
the exercise of power). Here Siegel offers three converging lines of argument.
First, the position applies as much to arguments used within any culture or
perspective as to those venturing beyond its borders. Second, the position
cannot coherently be supported, since doing so on its own terms entails merely
using rhetorical devices to mask the exercise of power. Third, if the position is
maintained without support, that "renders the issue itself incapable of being
coherently posed." (I don’t understand the third point, but Siegel refers the
reader to other works where presumably it is explained.)
There are at least the following ways to subject Siegel’s paper to critical
scrutiny.
(1) Question the precise meaning of the Independence Thesis. (What precisely
is his position?)
(2) Question whether Siegel’s representations of the positions he argues
against are accurate. (Does he attack straw men?)
(3) Examine Siegel’s four negative arguments for flaws. (Are his arguments
sound?)
(4) Question whether the Independence Thesis faces objections from the

general direction Siegel considers that his critiques of these four arguments do
not refute. That is, question whether Siegel has missed other criticisms of the
Independence Thesis from the direction of multi-culturalism or cultural
relativism. (Is his defence complete?)
The following comments assume the accuracy of Siegel’s representations of
the views he criticizes (2), and find no fault with Siegel’s four arguments (3).
They focus. instead, on the meaning of the Independence Thesis (1), and the
completeness of Siegel’s critique of multi-cultural relativism (4).
What precisely is the Independence Thesis? What does it mean to say that
what makes an argument epistemically good is that its premises provide
reasons for accepting its conclusion independently of the cultural locations and
perspectives of the person evaluating the argument? There seem to be
different possibilities, one of which is the following:
IT1 There are general normative epistemic criteria and principles of argument
evaluation for arguments—such as "True premises and valid form" or
"Premises that are worthy of acceptance and jointly sufficient," and so on—
and whatever the correct criteria and principles are (even if we do not know yet
what they are), they hold for all arguments, anywhere and anytime.
There is textual evidence that Siegel has at least IT1 in mind. The
"transcendence" position, as he expresses it, is the denial that "‘transcendent’
principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality" are
possible, which is a direct contradiction of IT1. So, in opposing the
"transcendence" position, Siegel does seem to be committed to IT1.
If Siegel’s characterization of the views he opposes is fair, and if those views
consist of arguments against IT1, then I think Siegel’s defence against cultural
relativism succeeds. The four claims or arguments he attributes to the cultural
relativists are clearly subject to the standard anti-relativist tag of being selfdefeating: any argument to support the view must rely on the very criteria for
good argument that it denies.
However, it is possible to endorse IT1 without thereby conceding that it is
possible to assess any and every particular argument’s quality independently
of who is conducting the evaluation and the cultural context of the argument. It is
consistent with IT1 that "the cultural locations and perspectives of the
evaluators" can make a difference to the assessment of the quality of particular
arguments.
For example, perhaps I consider an argument weak because I do not assign
much weight to one of its key premises, since that premise refers to difficulties
certain poor, uneducated, powerless, Canadian aboriginal women experience
on Indian Reserves, and I, being a prosperous educated middle-aged white
heterosexual anglo-saxon urban Canadian male, do not, and arguably cannot,
adequately understand the gravity of those difficulties. In the kind of case

imagined here, what is in intractable dispute are not the facts claimed, but their
probative weight. Let this one kind of example suffice to make the point; I
assume plenty of others could be found.
To be sure, Siegel can contend that the premise in question has a given
weight, and it should be assigned that weight, whether or not I or anyone else
can appreciate it: "[t]he premises of the argument provide whatever support for
its conclusion they do . . . whoever is conducting the evaluation, in whatever
cultural context." (Perhaps, while I underestimate the premise’s importance, its
proponents assign it too much weight.) But there is a problem. The
determination of that "correct" weight requires precisely the God’s-eye-view
that Siegel concedes is not available, because such questions about the
significance of factors tend to be contentious precisely among argument
assessors who have different perspectives on the issue, and in such cases no
disinterested perspective is possible. Lacking such a "neutral" perspective,
the assessors of this particular argument must somehow or other assign the
contentious premise some weight. The judgement could determine the
outcome of the overall assessment of the argument, and important matters,
such as social policy decisions, could well depend upon how the argument is
assessed. Moreover, quite often the perspective of those in positions of power
(for example, the members of the parliamentary committee hearing public
submissions) ends up being decisive in assigning weight to the contentious
premise.
None of these points is incompatible with IT1. However, they are incompatible
with other possible interpretations of IT. Consider IT2:
IT2 IT1 and: For any particular argument, the degree to which it satisfies the
normative epistemic criteria for arguments can, in principle, be determined by
anyone, regardless of the person’s cultural or other historical particulars.
Does Siegel’s Independence Thesis embrace IT2? As stated, IT2 is perhaps
too strong, since it implies, for instance, that someone with brain damage
should be as able to assess any argument as well as anyone else. But then,
does one replace "anyone" with "any normal person" or with "an ideal
observer"? That is a direction fraught with well-known difficulties. (A principal
difficulty is the dilemma: how a "normal" person or an "ideal" observer is
specified will either render the Independence Thesis analytic and vacuous, or
render it false.) So if we attribute IT2 to Siegel, we do him no favour.
Another way to formulate the Independence Thesis so that it precludes cultural
relativism with respect to particular arguments is IT3:
IT3 IT1 and: For any particular argument, the degree to which it satisfies the
normative epistemic criteria for arguments is accessible to inter-subjective
agreement, independently of the cultural or historical circumstances of the
assessors. Otherwise put: the inter-subjective rating of the normative epistemic
quality of any argument will be highly reliable, and the cultural or historical

circumstances of the assessors will not be an independent variable.
The trouble with IT3 is that it makes the truth of the Independence Thesis an
empirical matter. It thus may represent a more extreme naturalization of the
Independence Thesis than Siegel would tolerate. But what is worse, if IT3 is
what the Independence Thesis means, then the Independence Thesis is
probably false. While there is likely to be very high inter-rater reliability for a
great many arguments, there will be exceptions, especially when it comes to
just those arguments invoking premises and probative weightings that are
subject to the vagaries of inter-cultural and other (race, class or gender)
differences of perspectives.
Does Siegel’s position include IT2 or IT3 , or some variant of them? It is
unclear: he does not express IT precisely enough to permit a decision. His
comment that the premises provide whatever support for their conclusion they
do, regardless of who is conducting the evaluation or what its cultural context,
does seem to commit him to some such position. But if so, and if the cultural
relativism that is Siegel’s target is willing to grant IT1, but takes issue with IT2 or
IT3, then it is not refuted by Siegel’s arguments. Consider each of his
arguments in turn.
In Argument A, Siegel rightly points out that no completely transcendent
perspective is possible does not imply no transcendence of perspective is
possible. However, transcendence of perspective is possible is ambiguous
between "sometimes possible" and "always possible." From the fact that there
are circumstances and perspectives such that in some circumstances, some
perspectives can be transcended, it does not follow that in any circumstances,
any perspective can be transcended. Siegel does not establish the latter claim,
but needs to do so in order to show that cultural differences are never relevant
to the epistemic assessment of particular arguments.
In Argument B, Siegel rightly argues that from the fact that principles of
argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are articulated and
endorsed in particular historical/cultural circumstances it does not follow that
such principles and criteria apply only to arguments formulated in that context.
However, it is consistent with the generality of principles of argument
evaluation and criteria of argument quality that their application in particular
circumstances is subject to intractable disagreements due to cultural
differences. Siegel does not show the latter proposition to be false, but he
needs to, in order to show that cultural differences are never relevant to the
epistemic assessment of particular arguments.
In Argument C, Siegel correctly points out that anyone who holds that all norms
of argument quality are culturally relative cannot consistently claim to have a
transculturally good argument for that position, and moreover is prohibited by
the position from arguing against practices in other cultures. However, it does
not follow that agreement about the assessment of a particular argument’s
quality never founders on the reef of cultural difference. Yet Siegel needs to

deny this possibility in order to show that cultural differences are never relevant
to the epistemic assessment of particular arguments.
In Argument D, Siegel correctly points out that the position that argument is
always a rhetorical device masking the exercise of power both takes argument
out of play even within a cultural perspective and also cannot coherently be
supported by argument. However, he does not thereby show that argument is
never a rhetorical device masking the exercise of power, nor that the exercise
of power never plays a role in the epistemic assessment of arguments. Yet he
would need to make these points to show that such cultural differences as
differences in power are never relevant to the epistemic assessment of
particular arguments.
In sum, while Siegel shows that the multi-culturalism, et al., arguments fail to
preclude general epistemic criteria of good arguments, he does not show that
cultural and other differences are never relevant to the epistemic assessment
of particular arguments. It may be impossible to determine whether the general
epistemic criteria are satisfied for a given argument independently of the
cultural location and perspective of the person evaluating the argument. The
latter is a theoretically important point, because it seems to put a limit on the
role of argument for settling disagreements and establishing the truth at crucial
junctures. At the least, it leads to important and difficult questions about just
when such perspectives are pertinent and, when they are, just how they should
be accommodated.
Certainly it would be a mistake to generalize from the fact (if I am right) that the
epistemic merits of some arguments cannot be determined independently of
such factors as cultural, racial, class, or gender perspective, to the conclusion
that no arguments can be assessed independently of such factors. Such an
inference would be an egregious secundum quid. I would guess that the
occurrence of the perspectivally problematic arguments that the cultural
relativists draw attention to is actually quite rare, and if that’s so, then argument
still has enormous value in settling disagreements and establishing the truth.
To sum up: If, by the independence of epistemic norms, Siegel means the
independence of general criteria and principles of epistemic goodness of
arguments, and if the cultural relativists Siegel criticizes think that their position
implies that this general criterial independence is impossible, then Siegel’s
arguments show them to be mistaken. It seems—especially in hindsight, with
Siegel’s arguments in hand—to be a singularly implausible position. But one
can concede Siegel’s claim without conceding that cultural perspective is
never relevant to the epistemic assessment of particular arguments. In fact, all
that Siegel’s targets need to do in order to avoid checkmate by his arguments
is move to a slightly qualified version of their position. I don’t say that those
Siegel criticizes hold this more modest thesis (that cultural perspective can be
relevant to the epistemic assessment of particular arguments). Nor is it entirely
clear where Siegel stands on this point. What does seem clear is that his
arguments do not refute it. I have claimed that a case can be made that it is a

plausible thesis and that it is one that has considerable significance for the
practice of argumentation.
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